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OIn the local development landscape, no one builds with the expectation of decline. 
In the past 60 years, technological advances 
have contributed to the rise of high-wage, 
high-skill industries, including finance and 
advertising. Some local economies have 
shifted to include these new generators of 
capital, which has allowed them to adapt 
well to change. Cities and regions that 
have focused exclusively on manufacturing 
have inevitably declined.1  Many of these 
post-industrial cities in Northeastern 
and Midwestern America have found 
themselves in the position of planning for 
population decline, budget constraints, 
blight, and vacancy.2 
In addition to structural shifts in local 
economies, changes in political sentiment 
have further placed fiscal pressure on cities. 
Since the 1970s, most states have passed 
laws that restrict local governments from 
increasing taxes.3  In addition, dwindling 
revenue sharing to local governments 
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The narrative of deindustrialization and urban decline has been well-documented 
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inequities in the use and generation of capital with some degree of success, continued 
challenges, and/or worsening conditions. Promoting economic development after 
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This paper will define urban economic resilience as promoting a diversity of goods, 
services, and industries; managing and moderating market cycles; actively preventing 
stagnation and decline; and protecting vulnerable groups. The qualities of urban 
economic resilience should be promoted, especially in urban areas that have suffered 
from increasing political and economic constraints. This paper will examine the unique 
case study of Detroit, Michigan and the downtown Little Caesars Area development 
project. This example demonstrates how local governments have used traditional 
economic development tools in an attempt to achieve positive growth outcomes. 
However, the use of these tools merits sincere critique in the face of historical economic 
troubles and existing conditions of inequality and disinvestment. Ultimately, this paper 
critiques local economic development tools by highlighting the public and social costs 
of implementing them. 
has contributed to the mismatch between 
revenues and expenditures.4 
Given these restrictions, municipal decision 
makers have begun to engage in an 
“entrepreneurial” form of governance to 
promote local economic development.5  
Local governments can use subsidies 
such as tax abatements, low-interest loans, 
regulatory leniency, and land transfers to 
support large, private-sector projects with 
the expectation of expanding employment 
and economic activity.6,7  Local subsidization 
of development inherently results in 
public assumption of private risk, which 
Harvey characterizes as a marked shift from 
managerial to more speculative forms of 
governance.8  These new public-private 
partnerships reflect the ideological, financial, 
and political challenges of growing and 
revitalizing urban neighborhoods. This 
current model of economic development 
reveals the coercive power of private capital 
in shaping local decision making. 
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governments absorb the risks of private 
enterprise. Detroit has a pressing need 
to establish economic stability; achieving 
urban economic resilience is a process that 
may require financial, social, and political 
compromises in a city that has experienced 
decades of unfavorable investments.   
CHALLENGES TO 
DETROIT’S GROWTH
The city of Detroit offers rather extreme 
economic and political conditions in 
which to study economic development, 
but this context provides insight into 
broader constraints on local governance. 
Deindustrialization has played a widely 
recognized role in the city’s decline over 
the past 60 years.11  Decades of racially 
discriminatory federal policy, local planning, 
and real estate practices effectively 
enabled employment centers and the 
white population to move to the outlying 
suburbs.12 This slow-moving crisis hollowed 
out Detroit’s jobs and neighborhoods, 
a process that intensified after the 2008 
subprime mortgage crisis.13  As a result, 
almost 30% of Detroit’s housing stock 
is now vacant,14  creating a visually stark 
landscape that poignantly demonstrates 
the effects of political, social, and economic 
disinvestment. 
Because of this decline, the municipal 
government has struggled to maintain its 
role as a local service provider. The loss of 
population has forced 600,000 residents 
– almost 40% of whom are impoverished 
– to maintain water, sewage, and street 
infrastructure that was built for two million 
people.15,16  Faced with a shrinking and 
weakening tax base, reduced economic 
activity, and declining property values, 
local agencies have been forced to raise 
This shift in public decision-making 
begs the question of whether this form 
of economic development promotes 
economically resilient cities. Not only must 
local governments deal with increasing 
federal and state retrenchment,9 they 
are also vulnerable to recession under 
a neoliberal system that does little to 
moderate fluctuations in the private 
market.10  Somewhere between promoting 
city growth and keeping the lights on, 
local governments have been forced to 
make compromises to their fiscal security. 
This paper will discuss urban economic 
resilience as the promotion of a diversity 
of goods, services, and industries; the 
management of a market with cyclical 
booms and busts; active prevention of 
stagnation and decline; and protections 
for vulnerable populations. One can 
imagine that economic resilience, like 
equity, is an aspirational goal that is 
under-resourced, politically unpopular, 
and unlikely to be pursued without some 
forms of ideological compromise. Urban 
planners and policymakers must consider 
the implications of the pursuit of economic 
resilience, as well as the failure to do so. 
As one of the most recognizable examples 
of urban decline, the city of Detroit offers 
an important case study for modern 
economic development and the challenges 
of achieving economic resilience. While 
the city’s challenges are unique, they 
offer insight on economic development 
that can be applied more broadly. This 
paper will describe the structural forces 
that have contributed to Detroit’s multi-
faceted development challenges and 
the preconditions that forestall economic 
resilience. It will then analyze the Little 
Caesars Arena public-private partnership 
in Downtown Detroit. This analysis will 
challenge the logic of having local 
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DETROIT’S ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
LANDSCAPE
Amid over 100 square miles of single-
family neighborhoods that continue to 
lose population, the 7.2 square miles that 
comprise Detroit’s Downtown and Midtown 
neighborhoods have been growing. 
Because of its central location, “the 7.2” 
has been the focus of public and private 
investments in the city since at least the 
1990s. Dan Gilbert (the owner of Quicken 
Loans and the Cleveland Cavaliers) and the 
Illitch family (the owners of Little Caesars 
Pizza) are prominent billionaires who 
control large swaths of land in the 7.2. They 
have made significant investments in this 
part of Detroit and have received large 
public subsidies for their efforts.27 
Given these and other ventures, a private-
sector report recently hailed “America’s 
comeback city” as having successfully 
attracted development and diversified 
its economy.28  While these claims are 
somewhat dubious and certainly do not 
hold true for most of the city’s longtime 
and mostly black residents, they reflect the 
optimism of the private sector around the 
potential for profit-making in Detroit. Local 
public and private actors have both been 
heavily involved in promoting radical city-
building after decades of decline. These 
efforts, however, deserve sincere critique. 
DETROIT CASE STUDY: 
THE LITTLE CAESARS 
ARENA DEVELOPMENT
One of the major criticisms of government 
support for economic development is the 
use of public monies to subsidize profit-
the City’s property tax rate, which is currently 
one of the highest in the country.17,18 
Furthermore, the State of Michigan has 
been reducing its revenue sharing to local 
governments to deal with its own chronic 
deficits, which has resulted in further strain 
on the City.19  To deal with these and other 
serious issues, the City actively disinvested 
in certain neighborhoods for decades, 
cutting vital services like streetlights, police 
protection, and firefighting.20,21 In 2013, the 
City filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy with 
billions of dollars of debt and a stark inability 
to service its obligations.22,23 Discussing 
economic resilience in this context requires 
a nuanced understanding of the deep, 
structural challenges that impede municipal 
leaders from promoting fiscal stability. 
Given the complex causes of Detroit’s 
decline, two realities exist: The city of Detroit 
as a geographic entity is in desperate need 
of investment, which is generated by private 
economic activity. The City of Detroit as 
a municipal body is in desperate need of 
revenue, much of which is generated by 
economic activity and property tax revenue. 
According to the “urban growth machine” 
theory, the primary role of local governments 
is to promote a business climate favorable 
to growth, namely by raising property 
capital.24,25 Within the context of its extreme 
physical and economic decline, the City of 
Detroit has an especially dire need to attract 
capital to begin to improve its own fiscal 
condition, as well as to facilitate a meaningful 
recovery process for its residents. Although 
the methods for drawing investment to 
the city are politically contested,26  Detroit 
requires new capital to make meaningful 
progress toward economic resilience. 
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seeking activities. This is an especially 
salient point in Detroit, which only recently 
emerged from bankruptcy and still faces 
serious problems, such as a failing public 
school system.29  The development of the 
Little Caesars Arena in Downtown Detroit 
provides an important case study of the 
costs and compromises of local economic 
development. It raises questions about 
current processes and tools for promoting 
urban economic resilience, which 
impose undue costs on local third-party 
stakeholders.  
The Illitches have been acquiring lots in 
the 7.2 at least since the 1990s.30  They 
currently plan to redevelop a 50-block 
area that includes the Little Caesars Arena, 
which they have rebranded as the “District.” 
The estimated total investment in this area 
will be over $2 billion.31 The Arena, which 
is now home to the Detroit Red Wings 
hockey team, has received substantial 
public subsidies. In 2013, the Little Caesars 
Arena redevelopment project initially 
received $250 million of tax-exempt bonds 
from Detroit’s Downtown Development 
Authority. At the time, this amounted to 60 
percent of estimated construction costs.32  
The state later offered an additional $34.5 
million in new bonds and $4.85 million 
in closing costs and interest payments 
to support the relocation of the Pistons 
basketball team to the Little Caesars 
Arena from suburban Auburn Hills. By 
September 2017, the cost of the stadium 
had ballooned to $863 million.33  
State and local support for the stadium 
development has reached $289.4 million, 
one-third of the total construction costs. 
The development redirects property 
tax revenue in downtown Detroit’s tax 
increment financing (TIF) district to support 
redevelopment costs. The funding scheme 
diverts property tax revenue from a state 
education tax, the Wayne County Regional 
Educational Service Agency, and Detroit 
Public Schools.34 
THE ILLOGIC OF 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
FOR PRIVATE STADIUM 
DEVELOPMENT
One could make a case for the potentially 
catalytic nature of this redevelopment 
project, particularly in the context of 
Detroit. However, the facts of this project 
undermine justifications for public subsidy. 
First, experts have consistently criticized 
public subsidies for stadiums because of 
the lack of benefits for taxpayers. These 
developments often lead to above-market 
rates of return for investors, meaning 
that public financing and tax abatement 
policies essentially funnel excessive profits 
to the private sector. Highly publicized 
economic benefits in job creation and 
“spillover” effects are often unrealized. In 
addition, tax revenue from new stadiums 
to local governments often reflects a 
transfer of expenditures from one form 
of entertainment to another, meaning 
that the developments do not necessarily 
increase overall local and regional 
economic activity.35 This is especially true 
of the Red Wings’ move from Joe Louis 
Arena in Detroit and the Pistons’ move 
from suburban Auburn Hills. In spite of the 
claims of public benefit, the Little Caesars 
Arena may not contribute much to the City’s 
fiscal condition or to its residents outside 
of the 7.2 square miles of concentrated 
redevelopment. America’s cities and 
metropolitan areas are already marked 
by intense stratification;36 the disparities 
within Detroit and its surrounding region 
can only be amplified by continued uneven 
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development. The City cannot build its tax 
base around sports teams that have moved 
within and outside of the city multiple 
times in the last fifty years. Promoting 
economic resilience thus will likely require 
new methods beyond popular economic 
development tools. 
Another problematic aspect of the Little 
Caesars Arena development is the use 
of tax increment financing (TIF) to the 
detriment of the city’s public school system. 
TIF essentially redirects taxpayer money 
away from vital City services to support 
profit-seeking activities.37 This is particularly 
troubling for Detroit, which has struggled 
with poor public school performance and 
its effects on enrollment and families.38  By 
2051, $726 million of property tax revenue 
will be diverted from state and local public 
school funds to pay for the redevelopment.39 
Economic recovery and resilience at the 
neighborhood level require stable schools 
that support families and children, which 
requires substantial investment in the local 
school system. Far from redistributing the 
benefits of redevelopment to marginalized 
groups, Detroit’s arena project is depriving 
public schools of much-needed capital. 
A final critique of government support 
for private development asks whether the 
economic activity could have happened 
without subsidies. Besides the construction 
of the arena, the Illitches have made a $1.1 
billion investment in their massive District 
redevelopment project, an ongoing effort 
that does not use public subsidies. This 
suggests that the Illitches have a significant 
amount of capital and are more than willing 
to invest in Detroit. It begs the question 
of whether the subsidy for the arena was 
necessary at all. 
Herein lies the excruciating truth of 
economic development: city leaders take 
risks – correctly or incorrectly – to divert 
money from essential services to promote 
private enterprise with the hope of 
ultimately benefitting the city. In the case of 
Detroit, it is difficult to imagine a situation 
in which the City would reject an offer of 
substantial reinvestment, especially in the 
very year that the City filed for bankruptcy. 
This is likely no accident on the part of 
Detroit’s billionaire developers; both the 
Illitches and Dan Gilbert took advantage 
of the disorder caused by the 2013 
bankruptcy to readily acquire property 
and permissions for redevelopment. 
They were further empowered by weak 
community opposition to these proposals.40 
The projects did little, and arguably will 
do little, for Detroit’s most vulnerable 
and underserved populations. It is hard 
to say whether the Arena would have 
been built without public subsidies. It 
may be better to ask whether the Illitches 
could have afforded to pay for the arena 
without government support, in spite of 
the challenging development context of 
Detroit. A question of further relevance for 
economic development professionals is 
whether the City of Detroit can afford to 
subsidize development – or whether it can 
afford not to. 
CONCLUSION
The task of remaking a city is not easy. The 
City of Detroit has faced, and continues 
to face, strong fiscal constraints. Within 
this context, economic development 
professionals have worked behind the 
scenes to promote recovery and growth. 
While both public and private actors 
have contributed to the city’s recent 
improvements, one cannot help but 
question the methods of recovery that 
have actively disinvested from Detroit’s 
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many impoverished, disenfranchised, and 
minority neighborhoods. When public 
financing is involved, urban planners must 
be vigilant in determining appropriate uses 
of limited taxpayer resources.
 
This brief discussion of development in 
Detroit illuminates the elusive nature of 
true economic resilience. Peck discusses 
the phenomenon of “trickle-down 
austerity,” in which federal retrenchment 
transfers financial burdens to lower levels 
of government.41  Under this conception 
of urban governance, it follows that local 
governments are heavily restricted in their 
ability to promote resilience, especially 
for their more vulnerable constituents. 
Counties, cities, townships, neighborhoods, 
and blocks will vary in their ability to 
manage shrinking resources, depending 
on their political, financial, and social 
capital. Local governments will thus have 
varying degrees of success in adjusting 
to the multi-faceted restrictions that 
have been imposed on them. Economic 
development tools like subsidies for 
stadiums give local government bodies 
the ability to build up resilience, though 
not without consequences for the city as a 
whole. Ultimately, the question of economic 
resilience is one that could be resolved 
by a shift in how resources are allocated 
at the state and federal levels. Discussions 
about strengthening our cities and regions 
must engage higher governmental units to 
promote economic resilience through the 
redistribution of resources. ■
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